ASEAN is no longer a distant regional organisation in Bangladesh's foreign policy, but rather it is gradually becoming a strategic aspiration. During the interim government's tenure, the question of Bangladesh's inclusion in ASEAN was raised anew in diplomatic discussions. The issue resurfaced in conjunction with the new government's visit to Malaysia. The question is, can Bangladesh truly become a member of ASEAN?

The answer to this question is not simple. This is because ASEAN is not just a commercial alliance; it is a geographical, political, security, and institutional community. Bangladesh is economically significant, demographically strong, geographically located at the junction of South and Southeast Asia, and is becoming increasingly important in the geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal. However, attaining ASEAN membership is not solely dependent on potential; it relies on the language of the charter, consensus among member states, institutional capacity, geographical identity, political confidence, and regional balance.

According to Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter, there are four fundamental conditions for becoming a new member. First, the state's location must be within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia. Second, it must be recognised by all ASEAN member states. Third, it must abide by the ASEAN Charter. Fourth, it must demonstrate the capability and willingness to fulfill the responsibilities of membership.

Beyond these, there is a practical political condition: decisions in ASEAN are made based on consensus; a single member state’s objection can halt full membership. Geographically, Bangladesh is a South Asian state. But in terms of strategic geography, Bangladesh is at the nexus of South and Southeast Asia.

Bangladesh shares a border with Myanmar, has potential maritime connections with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore through the Bay of Bengal, and historically there were exchanges of trade, labour, religion, and culture among Arakan, Chattogram, the Bay of Bengal, and the Malay world. Therefore, Bangladesh's argument might be: we are not on the edge of the map but rather stand on the bridge between two regions. However, ASEAN does not admit members solely based on strategic imagination. The example of Timor-Leste is pertinent here. Despite undoubtedly being within the geographical region of Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste had to wait more than 14 years to become a full member after applying in 2011.

Where does Bangladesh's potential lie? First, Bangladesh is a large market. The economy of about 180 million people, a young workforce, and Bangladesh’s capabilities in the garments industry, pharmaceuticals, agro-processed products, shipbuilding, information technology, and services may be attractive to ASEAN. Many ASEAN countries are rapidly aging.

Countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand need foreign workers in their labour markets. If Bangladesh's workforce is managed through skills, language, rights, and fair recruitment systems, it can create practical links with the ASEAN economy.

Secondly, Bangladesh is a central state of the Bay of Bengal. In today’s Indo-Pacific politics, the Bay of Bengal is not just a sea; it is a trade route, an area of energy security, naval connectivity, coastal economies, climate risks, and geopolitical rivalries. If ASEAN wants to define itself not just around the Mekong or South China Sea but as a broader maritime Southeast Asia, ignoring Bangladesh would be difficult. Ports like Chittagong, Matarbari, Payra, Mongla are not just assets of Bangladesh; they can be trade corridors for South and Southeast Asia.

Thirdly, Bangladesh can be a bridge connecting ASEAN with South Asia. SAARC is almost dysfunctional, BIMSTEC has not yet gained full political strength, and India-China rivalries have complicated regional cooperation. In this scenario, if Bangladesh builds deep partnerships with ASEAN, it would not only benefit Bangladesh but also ASEAN. Because ASEAN would then gain a new gateway for trade, connectivity, labour markets, climate cooperation, and security discussions with South Asia.

However, alongside potentials, there are tough questions. The first question is geographical. ASEAN countries might argue that Bangladesh does not fall within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia. This geographical objection could be the largest legal and political hurdle.

The second question is ASEAN’s internal capacity. Including Timor-Leste took ASEAN a long time. Taking a South Asian state with a large population, complex economy, and political sensitivity as a member might be concerning within ASEAN. ASEAN makes decisions slowly, by consensus, avoiding conflicts. Will South Asian tensions, India-Bangladesh relations, the Myanmar crisis, the Rohingya issue, and China-India competition enter ASEAN's fold if Bangladesh joins? Some members will undoubtedly raise these questions.

The third question is the Myanmar and Rohingya crisis. The relationship between Bangladesh and Myanmar is deeply complicated by the Rohingya issue. ASEAN itself is divided and embarrassed over the Myanmar crisis. If Bangladesh were included, would ASEAN become a more direct party to the Rohingya problem? Or, would including Bangladesh open a new diplomatic path to solving the crisis? ASEAN members will not have a unified stance on these two arguments.

The fourth question is institutional compatibility. ASEAN membership entails continuous participation in hundreds of meetings, legal documentation, economic standards, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, investment policies, digital connectivity, labour policies, anti-human trafficking mechanisms, disaster management, education, health, and environment. Has Bangladesh prepared administratively for this? Membership does not come through political declarations alone; it comes through preparation based on ministries, expert teams, legal frameworks, policy coordination, and enduring diplomatic patience.

Therefore, the most realistic path for Bangladesh is to proceed step by step. The first step might be attaining the status of a Sectoral Dialogue Partner. Bangladesh has already shown interest in this path. Attaining this status would allow Bangladesh to work with ASEAN in specific areas such as trade, labour, education, health, disaster management, climate, maritime security, and the digital economy. The second step could be a Dialogue Partner or an Enhanced Partnership. The third step might be special observer status or an independent ‘Bangladesh-ASEAN Connectivity Roadmap’. If full membership is a long-term goal, it should be thought of as a ten-year strategy rather than a demand for today.

Bangladesh can then undertake three tasks. First, frame a ‘connectivity-based argument’ rather than attacking the geopolitical debate politically—what matters more than being part of Southeast Asia is how effectively Bangladesh is connected with Southeast Asia. Second, deepen bilateral relations with ASEAN member states, especially with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines. Third, Bangladesh needs to transition from being a labour-exporting country to a partner in skills, investment, technology, education, and marine cooperation.

ASEAN may offer Bangladesh some conditions. For example: working initially as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner; reviewing the ASEAN charter and legal documents; increasing trade and connectivity with Southeast Asia; ensuring fair recruitment in labour migration; taking credible measures to control human trafficking, cybercrime, and irregular migration; modernising ports, customs, and supply chains; building a coordinated diplomacy instead of conflict over Myanmar and the Rohingya issue with ASEAN; and showing internal political stability, rule of law, and policy continuity.

Therefore, Bangladesh's strategy should not be emotional but institutional. Strengthening an ASEAN cell in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducting targeted diplomacy in every ASEAN capital, involving research institutions and business communities, creating experts on ASEAN language and policy, increasing port connectivity and direct shipping, creating a fair recruitment model in Malaysia and Singapore's labour markets—without these, membership claims will remain on paper, not in reality.

#AKM Ahsan Ullah is a Professor, International, Security, and Migration
University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei

akmahsanullah@gmail. com
*Opinions expressed here are the author's own.

#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam